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I.

INTRODUCTION

A more conservative judiciary interacting with more complex and
disputatious agency responsibilities leads to the conclusion that
more attention must be paid by federal natural resource agencies.
What follows is a view from the trenches, as a Department of the
Interior retread, rather than from my previous perch in academia.
The usual disclaimer about not speaking for the agency applies these are musings, not policy.
(Some of the examples and ideas
that follow are found in Coggins, Wilkinson and Leshy, Federal
Public Land and Resources LLaw (3d. ed. 1993), e.g., at pp. 227251, 506-510, 570-80, 610-21, 694-702.)
II.

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCIES - AN
OVERVIEW

A.
The Department of the Interior plays an array of roles in
natural resources - as developer, as permittee of development, as
regulator of public or private development, as trustee for tribes.
Each role potentially implicates takings, but context can be
crucial. I want to confine myself here basically to the role the
Department plays as owner/manager of federal natural resources
under its jurisdiction; timber, minerals, water, etc.
B.
Although state law usually determines the parameters of
property interests subject to Fifth Amendment protection, whatever
private property interests exist in these federal natural resources
are nearly always created in the first instance by federal law,
contract, regulation, or some combination.
(For an exception,
consider the important, if murky, role state law plays in
determining property interests conveyed in a federal contract to
deliver water from a federal reclamation project.)
C.

Some generic questions are implicated here; for example:
— Should property interests in natural resources be treated
differently from other property interests?
Cf. John Muir
("Everything is hitched to everything else"); Sax, "Property
Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v .
South Carolina Coastal Council." 45 Stanford L. Rev. 1433
(1993).
— Is there any case to be made for treating federally-owned
natural resources differently?
Is it significant that in
mandating multiple use/sustained yield management on hundreds
of millions of acres of federal land, Congress has recognized

the interaction of various uses and made sustainability a
paramount management goal.
— Apart from the specific terms of a statute or a lease or
permit, what expectations may an owner of a property interest
in a federal natural resource legitimately have?
Cf. United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) ("The United States, as
owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain,
maintains broad powers over the terms and conditions upon
which the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired. ...
Claimants thus take their ... interests with the knowledge
that the Government retains substantial regulatory power over
... [them].")
III. THE ROLES OF THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS IN CREATING AND
DEFINING PROPERTY INTERESTS IN FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCES.
A.
Sometimes Congress makes the matter clear; e.g., it has
forbidden the Executive from creating a property interest in a
grazing permit, see 43 U.S.C. 315b, although the matter continues
to be debated in the political arena.
B.
Sometimes Congress creates a fairly elaborate scheme for
balancing property interests against governmental regulatory power.
It has, for example, authorized the government to extinguish an
opportunity to develop oil and gas resources on the Outer
Continental Shelf previously allowed, and defined the measure of
compensation in such circumstances with some specificity.
OCS
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1334.
C.
Sometimes Congress seems to cotemplate that some property
interest will be conveyed by a legal instrument like a mineral
lease, or the filing of a mining claim, but leaves up to the
executive and the courts to figure out just what that interest is,
and when it vests.
D. Sometimes Congress leaves the Executive with very broad power
to determine what kind of property interest, if any, to convey in
federal natural resources? e.g., FLPMA Title V right-of-way permit.
IV.

HOW SHOULD THE EXECUTIVE EXERCISE ITS AUTHORITY TO DEFINE
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCES?

A. Subject to the variations and limitations already mentioned,
there are, as a general matter, many circumstances in which the
federal natural resources agencies currently have the legal
authority to include, by regulation or as a term of a permit,
contract or lease, what might be called an "environmental
contingency" to help withstand takings challenges.
This clause
would, in effect, seek to preserve the agency's authority to
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restrict or stop activities it previously authorized to develop
those resources; e.g., oil production, coal mining, timber
harvesting, or the use of water for such things as hydropower
generation and agricultural irrigation.
It seeks to more
specifically
define
what
legitimate,
legally-recognized
expectations are, and who bears the risk of what.
In short, it
seeks effectively to limit the property interests being conveyed,
and by so doing defeat or at least substantially undercut takings
claims.
B. There are a number of examples of such clauses in use - whether
initially in statute, or found only in regulations. See, e.g., OCS
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1334; Forest Service timber harvesting
regulation, 36 C.F.R. 223.116(a)(5).
The idea goes quite a ways
back; see the Federal Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. 807.
C.
Yet the natural resource agencies are not, in general,
exercising this power nearly to the extent they could.
Should
they?
What are the costs, and what are the benefits, to more
widespread use of this approach in the current climate of "takings"
sensitivities?
1. Political costs - it's better to leave matters vague and
uncertain than to create controversy by trying to clarify
them.
Cf. the Forest Service's experience with its
"contingent rights" stipulation in oil and gas leasing. Here
the time lag (often many years) between the decision that may
create a "taking" and the ultimate determination of whether a
taking has occurred is especially influential. Also important
here is the question of who pays within the executive branch the program agency making the decision, or someone else?
(Usually the answer is someone else; namely, the Judgment
Fund, see 31 U.S.C. 1304.)
2. Economic costs - Leshy's paradox:
The federal treasury
may in some circumstances suffer more from winning a takings
case than losing it. How does an "environmental contingency"
announced up front affect bidding behavior,
in those
circumstances in which federal natural rsources are subject to
auction?
Consider also here the developers' need for
"certainty" - often genuine but often magnified; e.g., the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System; the American Barrick patent
under the Mining Law.
3.
Decisionmaking costs - is an environmental contingency
merely an inducement to sloppy upfront decisionmaking by the
federal agency?
Can realistic forecasts be made about the
likelihood of environmental harm in any event? Is too much
demanded of NEPA in some contexts?
In the oil and gas
context, for example, it may take several decades to move from
planning through leasing, exploration, and development.
Trying
to
determine
before
leases
are
issued
what
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environmental consequences are "reasonably foreseeable" is a
challenge, to say the least. See generally Land Use Planning
and Oil and Gas Leasing on Onshore Federal Lands (National
Academy Press, 1989), pp. 116-17.
D.
Is there a way to design an "environmental contingency"
stipulation that maximizes the benefits and minimizes these costs?
Consider the OCS model, which limits the circumstances under which
the reserved authority may be exercised, and defines a measure of
compensation (the lesser of sunk costs or market value).
1.
On the circumstances-limiting side, should such a
contingency be limited to unforeseen environmental harm?
Unforeseeable environmental harm?
Cataclysmic harm? Major
harm?
If the government blew it in its NEPA analysis, who
should pay, the developer or the Treasury?
If we say the
latter,
are we encouraging the developer
(who often
participates heavily in the NEPA phase) to put its head in the
sand?
2.
On the defining-compensation side, how feasible are
devices like bidding credits on future sales, or royalty
credits on other leases? Exchanges of property interests for
like interests elsewhere?
Cf. Whitney Benefits. Inc, v.
United States. 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and the use of
"transferable development rights" now fairly common in zoning.
A conventional answer is "great in theory, but nearly
unworkable in practice," but is that because not enough effort
has been made?
3.
Should the agencies address the matter by generic
regulation, by standard lease term, on a case-by-case basis,
or in bargaining over individual leases or contracts?
(Agencies vary considerably in how they approach such matters
- some emphasize regulations; others have relatively few
regulations or standard terms, and operate much more through
negotiation with recipients.) Should the natural resources
agencies try for a common approach (or should the White House
address the issue in an Executive Order)?
Or is "local
control," variation and experimentation desirable?
E.
In general, should compensation arising from a regulatory
takings decision by an agency come, in whole or in part, from the
agency's budget?
F.
Consider the following variant on the defining-compensation
issue: Should federal natural resource agencies adopt "variance"
clauses giving them the right to choose to allow development to go
ahead when the costs of effectively buying out property interests
are deemed too high? Such clauses are nearly universal in zoning,
and do appear in some contexts in some environmental regulatory
statutes; e.g., the Clean Water Act. But they have generally been
4

resisted by environmental groups, on the ground that no exemption
or waiver from an environmental standard is ever appropriate, or is
too subject to abuse.
Can such a waiver clause be designed to
minimize opportunities for abuse?
G. If the executive agencies do become more aggressive in the use
of "environmental contingency" stipulations, will the courts apply
them? See, e.g., U.S. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.. 311 U.S.
377 (1940).
V.

CONCLUSION - IS MUDDLING THROUGH INEVITABLE?
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